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Security in User- Assisted 
Communications
TONY ZHOU 
Abstract
Today, companies called service providers enable communications and control the 
related infrastructures. However, with increased computing power, advanced wireless 
technologies and more standardized terminals, users in the future will be able to take 
more control of communications. In this paper, we define and discuss a disruptive 
communication model called User-Assisted Communications (UAC), which allows 
users to assist other users to establish communications, and propose a method for 
managing trust and security, which are the most challenging variables in UAC and 
must be addressed before UAC can be implemented successfully. A Social Network 
based Trust Establishment (SN-TE) is proposed for UAC implementation.
Keywords: Trust, Social Network, User, Service Provider, Digital Certificate, 
Authentication, Decision.
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, service providers 
provide subscribers with 
communication services, including 
telephone and Internet access. 
Subscribers need to connect their 
devices (i.e. cell phones and 
computers) to service providers’ 
network to establish 
communications. Since 1990’s, 
wireless and packet data 
technologies have offered more 
advanced functions to support 
mobility and high-speed 
connections. With these capabilities, 
we envision a future where end users 
can provide services as well. This 
disruptive new model will benefit 
both the users and the service 
providers. In this paper, we propose 
a novel scheme for users to use their 
tangible (i.e. mobile phone, Wi-Fi 
Access Point (AP) and Internet 
connection) and intangible (i.e. 
identity, social relationship and 
reputation) assets to help others 
establish communications. The 
served users can save costs, and the 
serving users get credits for serving 
others. Also, the service providers’ 
network resources can be utilized 
more efficiently.  Figure 1 depicts 
the architecture of UAC including 
STAtion (STA), AP, Backhaul and 
Application Servers (for security, 
trust, billing, reputation, etc.).
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Figure 1 UAC architecture 
In a service provider-controlled 
environment, the subscribers take 
the service provider as a trusted 
authority and rely on it to establish 
communications. However, with the 
UAC approach, the users who assist 
others may not have reputation. The 
rest of this paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we explain the 
terminologies used in this paper. In 
Section 3, we classify UAC.  A 
survey of related work is presented 
in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
discuss UAC implementation, 
including patent-pending solutions 
and how to solve the trust issue 
using SN-TE.  Finally, we conclude 
the paper in Section 6.  
2. Definitions and terminologies 
User-Assisted Communications 
(UAC)  
We define UAC as a framework to 
allow a user to assist another user 
and/or a service provider to establish 
communications. The word 
communication is a generic term in 
this paper that includes any types of 
data transmission, such as Internet 
access and file transfer, between two 
entities. Each individual has the 
capability to define his/her own 
AAA (Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting) [20] 
policy for offering services. We 
envision that UAC will challenge 
and compliment the current service 
provider controlled communications. 
Different types of UAC are 
classified in Section 3. 
Serving user or node 
A user or node that assists others 
to establish communications is 
called serving user or node.
Served user or node  
A user or node that is assisted by 
others during communications 
establishment is called served user 
or node. 
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Trust
In social world, trust is the 
perception of people’s confidence or 
faith in something or somebody. In 
scientific research, it may be 
quantified to different trust levels. 
Trust plays a critical role in UAC. 
User A may provide a class of 
service for User B and another class 
of service for User C based on 
his/her trust relationship with B and 
C.
Transitive trust 
If A trusts B and B trusts C, A 
may trust C to some degree. This is 
called transitive trust. Trust can be 
either transitive or non-transitive 
depending on the judgments of 
people. People who accept transitive 
trust believe a friend’s friend is 
likely to be a friend.  
Trust path  
In transitive trust, if a user trusts 
another user through other users, we 
say there is a trust path from a user 
to another user. For example, if A 
trusts B, B trust C and C trusts D, we 
have the trust path A Æ B Æ C Æ
D. However, D may trust A from 
another path, such as D Æ E Æ F Æ
A.
Social network 
In many cases, people do not 
know each other directly. However, 
they could be socially connected 
through friendship, work 
relationship, blood relationship, 
community (i.e. club members and 
neighbors), or any combination of 
them. This type of intangible 
connection is called social network.
Social network based trust 
establishment (SN-TE)
In point-to-point communications, 
if two parties do not trust each other 
directly, they discover the possible 
connections between them through 
social network, upon which they 
make trust decisions separately. This 
is referred as SN-TE in this paper.
3. UAC classification 
UAC covers a wide range of 
solutions for establishing 
communications. We classify it from 
four different angles.  
1) Based on trust structure, 
we classify UAC as hierarchical
trust based UAC and non-
hierarchical trust based UAC. By 
hierarchical trust, we refer to the 
existence of an entity that is 
commonly trusted by all other 
parties. Hierarchical trust exhibits a 
tree structure. All the child nodes 
trust their parent nodes completely, 
and the trust is transitive. The node-
to-node relationship in hierarchical 
UAC is relatively simple comparing 
with non-hierarchical UAC. 
However, a central authority (root) is 
not always available. In non-
hierarchical trust UAC, there is no 
concept of levels and no commonly 
trusted party like the root of the tree. 
Each party acts autonomously as its 
own authority for making trust 
decisions. Thus, non-hierarchical 
structure exhibits a web structure. 
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Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) depict the 
node-to-node relationships in 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
trust based UAC respectively. (The 
arrow points to the trusted person). 
Non-hierarchical UAC is more 
complicated than hierarchical UAC. 
Figure 2 (a) Hierarchical trust UAC
Figure 2 (b) Non-hierarchical 
trust UAC
In public key certification system, 
ITU X.509 [18] is the de facto
standard for hierarchical trust, and 
PGP [18] is a popular solution for 
non-hierarchical trust.
2) Based on operation mode, we 
have application mode UAC and 
transport mode UAC. The 
application mode allows the serving 
user to offer services to a served 
user, while the transport mode only 
relays data as a dumb pipe. An 
application mode UAC is described 
in [1], which is a solution to transfer 
encrypted content from a serving 
user to a served user in a Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) manner. Upon successful 
content transmission, a Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) 
controller releases the decryption 
key to the served user. An example 
of transport mode is that a serving 
user provides a served user with the 
unused bandwidth.  
3) Based on the number of 
intermediate hops, we have single-
serving-user UAC and multi-serving-
user UAC. Between the served user 
and the target, if there is only one 
serving user to assist 
communications, we call it single-
serving-user UAC. Figure 3 (a) 
shows a served user connects to only 
one serving user. The served user 
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trusts the serving user through Users 
2, 3 and 4, and the serving user 
trusts the served user through Users 
5 and 6. If there are multiple serving 
users between the served user and 
the target, we refer it as multi-
serving-user UAC (Figure 3 (b)). 
Figure 3 (a) Single-serving-user UAC 
Figure 3 (b) Multi-serving-user UAC 
4) Based on user and service 
provider involvement, we have user-
only UAC and joint UAC. UAC can 
be established solely by individual 
users without any support of service 
provider’s network. For example, a 
community can form a wireless 
network with user-owned access 
point installed in each household for 
intra-community communications. 
We call this user-only UAC (Figure 
4 (a)). As the service providers have 
already established and managed 
backhaul network, such as Internet 
and wireless network, it appears 
more efficient to leverage the service 
provider’s network for UAC when it 
is available. This is referred as joint 
UAC (Figure 4 (b)). Unlike wireless 
mesh network [19], which is a free 
data flow model, each node in UAC 
has the option to enable trust check 
using AAA technologies [20]. In 
Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b), Users B and 
C have enabled this option.
Trust path 
Trust path ····· ., Trust path ····· .... 
S==@==@" '. ~~~ Serling Servmg User User 
: . : 
:"' ··",,· Trust path :.., ,, ·· ··· Trustpath 
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Figure 4 (a) User-only UAC 
Figure 4 (b) Joint UAC 
4. Related areas and works 
UAC incorporates many aspects 
of the related technologies, including 
AAA [20], wireless mesh network 
[19], ad hoc network [11] and P2P 
[8]. In addition, UAC leverages the 
social behavior and asset of users, 
such as trust establishment, social 
network and reputation. UAC 
distinguishes itself on personalized 
trust management and authorization. 
We envision that advanced wireless 
technologies will provide people 
with capabilities to offer services to 
others. Many people may have the 
experience of connecting to 
neighbor’s WiFi to access the 
Internet if the AP is not password-
protected. UAC has been designed 
to provide users with strong control 
over establishing communications 
based individual’s decision. UAC as 
a non-authority facilitated 
communication service has 
challenged the traditional authority-
offered service. The efforts should 
be rewarded by the served users and 
the service providers who are 
benefited from cost saving and 
resource saving respectively.
Municipal WiFi network
Several cities in the U.S. have 
announced their plans to build 
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citywide WiFi networks for 
residential. In Philadelphia, 
Earthlink will provide the city 
government, schools and other 
entities with free wireless Internet 
access while charging about $20 per 
month for private access [3]. 
Comparing with UAC, municipal 
WiFi network is still a trusted 
authority-provided network.  
Wireless mesh network (WMN) 
WMN [19] allows data to be 
transmitted freely over any available 
resources. It can increase the 
network reliability as data can reach 
destination through different paths 
and a damaged intermediate node 
cannot stop the data flow from other 
nodes. But WMN still lacks efficient 
and scalable security solutions [19]. 
In UAC, each node is able to define 
its AAA [20] policy.  
Ad hoc network 
Without any infrastructure 
support, ad hoc networks [11] are 
self-formed for temporary 
connections of mobile nodes. IETF 
has formed a Mobile Ad hoc 
NETwork working group (MANET) 
to standardize IP routing protocol 
functionality suitable for wireless 
routing application within both static 
and dynamic topologies [22]. The 
key management schemes of ad hoc 
networks (with or without a trusted 
third party) have been summarized 
in [11]. These schemes can be 
adopted by UAC.  In contrast to ad 
hoc networks, UAC allows users to 
offer a variety of services, such as 
file transfer [1] and location 
determination [2], and obtain credits 
in return.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
P2P [8] has changed data 
distribution from a centralized model 
to a distributed model. P2P file 
sharing systems, such as Napster and 
Gnutella, emerge as a controversial 
technology enabling a user to 
retrieve content from other users 
rather than the original content 
owner. Mobile operators are better 
suited to solve some of the typical 
P2P issues because they have greater 
control over their subscribers [12]. A 
fully self-organized security scenario 
using asymmetric-key approach and 
symmetric-key approach has been 
discussed in [13]. In UAC, users can 
offer additional new services, such 
as paging [5], bandwidth sharing [2] 
and conference hub [7], leveraging 
their resources in a P2P manner.
Digital certificate 
A digital certificate binds a user’s 
public key to his/her identity with 
the certificate-issuer’s digital 
signature. ITU X.509 [18] digital 
certification is based on hierarchical 
structure, while PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy) [18] certification takes non-
hierarchical structure. PGP has 
introduced two key attributes, 
validate level and trust level, for a 
user to determine the confidence 
level of another user’s certificate and 
another user’s certification 
capability respectively. We utilize 
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PGP for SN-TE implementation in 
this paper. 
Small world phenomenon 
First tested by social psychologist 
Stanley Milgram in 1967, small 
world phenomenon has attracted 
many researchers from social and 
computing areas. It suggests that 
people are connected through a short 
chain of acquaintances (six degree of 
separation) [21]. UAC is inspired 
and backed up by the small world 
phenomenon. The six degree of 
separation property makes SN-TE 
practical as it is very possible that a 
trust path exists between two people 
who do not know each other 
directly. There are several Internet 
web sites built for social 
relationship, such as Linkedin.com. 
In addition, the buddy-list server for 
Instant Messaging (IM) can also be 
enhanced for searching relationships 
[6].
Trust management 
Trust is a function of context, 
identity, reputation, capability and 
stake, and also conditioned by social 
and cultural factors [14]. Different 
trust models and quantification 
methods have been discussed in [4] 
[15]. We summarize the properties 
of trust as follows: 
x Trust is dynamic. It can be 
established, increased or 
decreased from time to time. 
x Trust is self-maintained and 
subjective.
x Trust can be transitive or non-
transitive depending each 
individual’s believe.  
x Trust has different levels. (i.e. 
complete trust and marginal 
trust)
In Section 5, we discuss SN-TE 
using enhanced PGP and how to 
make trust decisions.  
Mobile Bazzar (MoB) 
MoB [2] has introduced an open 
market concept to promote fine-
grained competition by decoupling 
infrastructure providers from service 
providers. We share the same vision 
that any device can autonomously 
advertise services and resell services 
to other users. The MoB paper [2] 
has discussed the roles of reputation 
management and accounting in no-
trust model. In that paper, the 
authors express the security concern 
in open, collaborative environment 
and state that MoB does not 
explicitly address data security and 
integrity issues. In this paper, we 
include trust and security solutions 
for UAC. 
5. UAC implementation 
UAC can be formed in many 
different ways. A proper 
implementation can improve 
resource efficiency and increase 
customer loyalty. We have designed 
three patent-pending solutions 
(outlined below) that allow the 
served users to obtain services from 
serving users.  
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1) When an out-of-coverage user 
is called, the MSC (Mobile 
Switching Center) may page 
the user. Upon the cellular 
network paging timeout, the 
MSC requests the serving 
user(s) to relay a new paging 
message to the served user 
through a short-range wireless 
connection, such as WiFi. 
(Figure 5) The served user 
receives the paging message 
from the serving user and then 
establishes a connection to the 
serving user, who is 
connected to the service 
provider’s network [5].  
Figure 5 Paging extension 
2) Instant Messaging (IM) is a very 
popular service. Users create 
their buddy-lists on a server, and 
communicate with the buddies 
by text messaging or voice calls. 
A buddy-list server can be 
utilized to search for the 
common friends of the served 
user and the serving user. [6] 
provides a solution to allow a 
served user to access a serving 
user’s wireless AP because they 
can find a common friend from 
their buddy-lists (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 Buddy-list based UAC 
3) In a group call, each user needs 
to establish a separate reverse 
connection (from the user to the 
network) with a conference 
server. In the case that some of 
the group members are 
collocated, a user among them 
can serve as a hub to connect the 
surrounding users to the 
conference server. Figure 7 
illustrates that the served users 
connect to the serving user 
through WiFi, and the serving 
user connects to the cellular 
network [7]. 
4)
! _ Ell e~ .Ell - Cqlu"'- (;djt7 - ""Fi @y 
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Figure 7 Mobile-bridged conference call 
Many other UAC services may be 
discovered later. The rest of this paper 
focuses on the detailed discussion of a 
mobile originated one-hop transport 
mode UAC using SN-TE, which is 
based on non-hierarchical trust. Social 
network exists in different ways. In the 
following discussion, PGP is used as 
the method to construct SN-TE for 
UAC implementation. 
A. PGP and its limitation 
PGP was initially created for users to 
secure Internet Email, which is a one-
way communication. It is widely 
accepted by the mass and recognized as 
a key contribution to the applications of 
cryptography. Any individual user can 
issue certificates to others based on 
his/her personal judgment. The person 
who issues certificates to others is also 
referred as introducer. The introducer 
chains build a “web of trust”. The 
CERT_DEPTH parameter is used to 
define the maximum certification chain 
length, but it is unsure how this is used 
in evaluating certificate validity. PGP 
only allows one introducer. (i.e. in 
Figure 8, User 2 introduces User 3 to 
User 1.) The algorithm to evaluate the 
validity of public key is described in 
[16]. In other words, PGP has no 
capabilities for introducing other 
introducers [16]. This limitation does 
not support Social network, where 
chained introductions exist.
B. Enhanced PGP for SN-TE 
We propose the following PGP 
enhancements for SN-TE to support 
UAC implementation.  
1) Transitive trust is assumed 
between communication parties, 
including introducers. 
2) Six degree of separation is used 
as the default value for 
CERT_DEPTH when searching 
common friends of two 
communication parties.
3) Multiple disjoint and/or joint 
trust paths are supported for 
trust evaluation. 
4) Mutual trust between 
communication parties is 
supported.
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Figure 8 Social network based trust establishment (SN-TE) 
C. Call flow 
We assume User A and a Visitor (V) 
do not know each other. V explores the 
possibility to connect to the Internet via 
A’s AP. The call flow in Figure 9 
depicts how V’s STA negotiates with 
A’s AP using SN-TE in six stages. We 
also assume that A and V are able to 
obtain the needed certificates from a 
public PGP directory.
Figure 9 UAC call flow 
(1) A broadcasts its Service Set 
IDentifier (SSID) and indicates that it 
accepts PGP certificates. 
(2) V sends A its PGP digital 
certificates issued by B, C and D, which 
are denoted B <<V>>, C<<V>> and 
D<<V>> respectively.  
(3) A trusts X as a CA (although A 
doesn’t issue a digital certificate to X), 
but A doesn’t trust C as a CA. So 
X<<B>> and X<<D>> are accepted; 
C<<V>> is ignored. With the end to 
end data relay protocol and decision 
making methods discussed in the 
Section D, E and F, A is able to 
determine whether it wants to provide 
V with UAC service or not.  
(4) Similarly, V obtains B<<X>> and 
X<<A>> from the PGP directory on the 
Internet, and determines whether it 
wants A to provide UAC service or not. 
(We assume that A allows certificate 
search traffic to go through its AP for a 
short period of time.) 
(5) If both A and V are willing to 
establish a connection, they perform 
public key based Authentication and 
Key Agreement (AKA).  
(6) V sends secured data to the Internet 
through A’s AP. 
D. Single PGP certification path 
i ~ . ... ~-. w 
~e_~ ~ 
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In Figure 10, we assume that Node 1 
needs to check the validity of Node J’s 
public key before negotiating a 
connection with it, but Node 1 doesn’t 
have the validity information stored in 
its public ring. So Node 1 needs to find 
a PGP certification path from Node 1 to 
J in order to collect the “opinion” from 
the intermediate nodes and then made a 
decision. The “opinion” includes the 
PGP validity level and trust level, 
which are two key attributes in PGP. 
(For simplicity, we ignore other factors 
that may affect decision in this paper.) 
The validity level reflects a person’s 
confidence of another person’s the 
public key ownership, and the trust 
level indicates the degree to which a 
person trusts another person’s 
certification capability. As the two 
attributes are determined by each 
individual, they are deemed to be 
private. Section D1 describes a solution 
to relay the attributes from the 
intermediate hops to Node 1 with 
security and privacy protection. We 
refer the intermediate nodes as Node 2, 
…, Node i, Node i+1, … and Node J-1 
as shown in Figure 10. Each node 
except J has the validate level and the 
trust level to the next hop. We further 
assume that each intermediate hop has 
the addressing information of the next 
hop and the previous hop, and only one 
path between Node 1 and J exists. [9] 
has described an algorithm to search for 
the shortest PGP certification path. 
After a PGP certification search 
resulting in the validity and the trust 
level relayed back to Node 1 from each 
intermediate node on the certification 
path, Node 1 determines the validity of 
the target’s public key based on the 
decision making methods that are 
proposed in Section F. Vi, i+1 and Ti, i+1
represent the validity level and the trust 
level Node i assigned to Node i+1 
respectively. 
Figure 10 Single PGP certification path 
D1. Hop-by-hop data relay method using 
IKE-SKEME [10]. We propose the following 
security requirements for hop-by-hop data 
relay, which refers to data transmission from 
Node i+1 back to Node i.
x User mutual authentication – 
adjacent hops must authenticate 
each other. 
x Data confidentiality – private 
information, such as validate 
level and trust level, transmitted 
between hops cannot be 
decoded by eavesdroppers. 
x Data authenticity (integrity) – 
ensure data is from the intended 
source and not altered during 
transmission.  
x Privacy protection – a receiver 
cannot prove to a 3rd party that 
the received private information 
is from a certain sender.  
With the requirements above, we 
propose to use the IKE-SKEME 
protocol [10] with some modifications 
for the hop-by-hop data relay. Figure 11 
illustrates the scenario that A requests B 
to send B’s data (validity level and trust 
level) on B’s next hop (not shown), and 
how B responds to A. 
~~~ y.." .. 9 '·'···\;1 y """v 'U ~'_~~;:.,~~: .~.,_ .... , ••.•• ...-' .•.•.• , .. ..... ..... _ 1>. .•.•.•• -,/ 
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Step 1. A selects a random number NA
and use B’s public key to encrypt NA
and A’s identity (A). 
Step 2. B selects a random number NB
and uses A’s public key to encrypt NB,
B’s Data and B’s identity (B) to provide 
data confidentiality. B also attaches a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
for data authenticity (K0 = H (NA, NB)).
A is assured that the data is from B, but 
A cannot prove it to a 3rd party because 
the message from B has no bearing of 
B’s digital signature, and A can 
possibly forge the message by itself. 
Step 3. A acknowledges B after it 
verifies the data is from B and not 
altered during transmission.  
Figure 11 Hop-by-hop data relay 
D2. End-to-end data relay. With the 
hop-by-hop data relay method 
described above, the validity levels and 
the trust levels of all the intermediate 
nodes on the certification path can be 
relayed back to Node 1 securely. The 
PGP digital certificates are also relayed 
back to Node 1 by the intermediate 
nodes. The example in Figure 12 self-
explains how it works. (The immediate 
hop to the last node, Node 3 in the 
example, may only send back the 
validity level as the trust level is not 
needed by Node 1.) 
Figure 12 End-to-end data relay
A 
2. E, (Data, B, N, ), 
MAC,,(Data, B, A) 
B 
Data 
o 
SecurityinUserͲAssistedCommunications
E. Multiple paths 
It is possible that two or more 
certification paths exist from one node 
to another node. The paths can be 
disjoint or joint as shown in Figure 13 
and Figure 14 respectively. If the paths 
are disjoint like Path 1, …, Path i, …, 
and Path K in Figure 13, the data Node 
1 obtained from each path is 
independent. Several researchers have 
proposed metrics for measuring the 
assurance provided by a set of paths. 
For example, Beth et. al propose a 
formula to calculate the result of 
combined direct trust value. The design 
criteria for these metrics are not widely 
agreed upon [4] [17]. Section F 
describes our trust decision-making 
proposal. If between two nodes, some 
paths have joint points (Figure 14), the 
decision-making method should be 
adjusted to reflect redundant 
information. We defer joint path to 
future discussions.
Figure 13 Multiple disjoint paths 
Figure 14 Multiple joint paths 
F. Making decision 
Many factors can influence in 
making decision, such as risk and 
reputation. Some people may be more 
open and optimistic and some others 
may be more conservative. This paper 
limits the discussion to using validity 
and trust level for making decision on a 
single path or multiple disjoint paths.  
With the data collected from 
different nodes and paths, Node 1 can 
choose one of the proposed methods in 
Table 1 to decide if it trusts the 
legitimacy of the target’s public key. 
Similarly, the target (Node J) can check 
the validity of the Node 1’s public key. 
The certification path(s) from Node 1 to 
the target may differ from the path(s) 
from the target to Node 1. If both nodes 
accept each other’s public key, further 
handshake will occur to establish secure 
communications.
In the following, we describe a 
multiplication solution for calculating 
the public key validity. For a single 
certification path k from Node 1 to J, 
(;\.' •. ~ " .... ~
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we multiply the validity levels Vi,i+1 and the trust level Ti, i+1 as follows. 
Vk = ( 1,
2
1
1, * 

 
 ii
J
i
ii TV ) * VJ-1, J,
where Vk is the end to end validity level 
Node 1 calculated for the certification 
path k starting from Node 1 and ending 
at Node J. If there are multiple disjoint 
paths (K) between two nodes, the 
validity value of each path may be 
calculated.  
Node 1 uses the calculated validity 
value against a threshold (Table 1) it 
selects. If it is above the threshold, 
Node 1 trusts the target’s public key. 
Otherwise, Node 1 has no confidence 
on the key. Table 1 has provided 
different types of thresholds for making 
a decision.  
Table 1 Different types of thresholds
Threshold Description Condition  
Optimistic 
Threshold
(V1)
As long as there is a path with the validity level greater 
than V1, the public key of the target is considered as 
valid.
1VV i ! ,
(i = 1, 2, …, 
K)
Average
Threshold
(V2)
It requires the average of all disjoint paths to be above 
V2 for the public key to be considered as valid. 2
1
1
VV
K
i
K
i
!¦
 
Strict
Threshold
(V3)
Each of the certification path needs to have an end-to-
end validity level above V3 so that the public key is 
considered as valid. 
All Vi > V3,
(i = 1, 2, 
…K)
Aggregated 
Threshold
(V4)
If the total validity value calculated from all disjoint 
paths is more than V4, the public key of target is 
assumed to be valid. 
4
1
VV i
K
i
!¦
 
6.SummaryandFuture
Works
In this paper, we have introduced the 
new concept of UAC and proposed a 
method to solve its trust and security 
issues. We believe that UAC will create 
win-win opportunities for the service 
providers and the end users. The service 
providers and the served users can 
reduce costs and improve the 
performance of services. And the 
serving users can also benefit from 
helping others. UAC is a disruptive 
model that challenges today’s service 
provider-controlled communications. 
Our future works include UAC 
enhancements, simulation and 
prototyping.
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